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Abstract—Impersonators on Online Social Networks such as
Instagram are playing an important role in the propagation of
the content. These entities are the type of nefarious fake accounts
that intend to disguise a legitimate account by making similar
profiles. In addition to having impersonated profiles, we observed
a considerable engagement from these entities to the published
posts of verified accounts. Toward that end, we concentrate
on the engagement of impersonators in terms of active and
passive engagements which is studied in three major communities
including “Politician”, “News agency”, and “Sports star” on
Instagram. Inside each community, four verified accounts have
been selected. Based on implemented approach in our previous
studies [1], we have collected 4.8K comments, and 2.6K likes
across 566 posts created from 3.8K impersonators during 7
months. Our study shed light into this interesting phenomena and
provides a surprising observation that can help us to understand
better how impersonators engaging themselves inside Instagram
in terms of writing Comments and leaving Likes.
Index Terms—Impersonation; Instagram; Fake Engagement;
Fake Profile; Fake News; Bot; Social Media.
I. INTRODUCTION
Impersonators are most commonly found on all major so-
cial media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram,
YouTube and LinkedIn. Among these platforms, Instagram is
widely used by celebrities and influencers with different level
of popularity and visibility for their everyday activities and
news propagation. On other hand, this is a golden opportunity
for impersonators and recent studies show their considerable
presence in Instagram. In this era, fake news and weaponized
information is still a very hot topic and as it is presented
in previous studies [2] [1], one of the most common ways
of spreading fake news, disinformation, or false activities is
using fake profiles, where malicious users create social media
accounts impersonating a legitimate account and present them-
selves in profiles who are very similar to real persons in term
of profile metrics. This activity named as “Impersonating”
and impersonators are those accounts that are pretending to
be someone well-known or representative of a known brands,
company etc.
Furthermore, Fake Instagram profiles have a pretty clear
plan—they make accounts appear more popular than they are
and with bot services, they create fake engagement, too. Fake
engagements strike social media and especially Instagram,
which makes it considerably harder to understand which
posts are genuinely getting the best reaction from legitimate
accounts/followers.
From malicious activities in social media, a larger set of
threats has been identified including brand abuse, fraud and
follower farming. Therefore several lawsuits has been taken
in place in United State (along with other countries), where
criminal impersonation is a crime that is governed by states
laws, which vary by state. It involved assuming a false identity
with the intent to defraud another or pretending to be a
representative of another person or organisation [3].
In this paper, we aim to understand the impact of imperson-
ators on fake content production and propagation by analysing
the tactics meant to lure the user attractions to the produced
or fabricated content. Toward that end, we picked three dis-
tinct communities on Instagram including “Politician”, “News
agency”, and “Sports star”. Inside each category, we selected
four top verified genuine accounts and we collected a great
number of posts beside comments and likes (in a 7-month
period). For each one, we detected and extracted the imper-
sonator profiles based on our methodology presented in [1],
and we ended up with 3.8K dataset. Next, we clustered them
into three groups C0-Fan-Pages, C1-Ordinary-Users, and C2-
BotLike based on profile and activity characteristics.
In this study, We first, investigate the portion of the com-
ment, like, and post that are distributed by impersonators
across communities. Next, to understand what is being shared,
we analyse the comments. In this regard, we use natural lan-
guage processing (NLP) techniques to understand the context
of the written text and analyse the semantic and sentiment
aspects. The contribution of this study can be summarised as
follow:
• We assemble a precious dataset of the content and activ-
ities of impersonators in three leading communities.
• provides a comprehensive analysis of the behaviour of
impersonators in the shape of active and passive engage-
ment.
• provides the first analysis of how impersonators create
fake engagements across leading communities on Insta-
gram.
• presents an investigation of the content that is produced
by impersonators across communities which potentially
lead us to type of fake contents.
The remaining of this study is as follows. Section II gives
the related studies. The process of data crawling, the descrip-
tion of communities, validation and the dataset are described
in section III. The concept of detection of impersonators is
specified in IV. Next, we investigate the behaviour of imper-
sonators and the communities they target in section V. Next,
we analyse the content that is distributed by impersonators in
section VI. Finally, section VII shows future directions and
concludes the study.
II. RELATED WORK
Fake account: Recent research has worked on related re-
search problems and dedicated a fair amount of work to study
a different aspect of OSNs. In this era, looking to behavioural
aspect of users and understand the different pattern of activities
is still a hot topic of research. Several studies tried to shed light
on this direction by profiling users based on their activities
and reactions. This work [4] presents a novel technique to
discriminate real accounts on social networks from fake ones.
The writers from this [5] study provide a review of existing and
state-of-the-art Sybil detection methods with an introductory
approach and present some of the emerging open issues for
Sybil detection in Online Social Networks.
Bot: On the other hand, the huge existence of Bots can alter
the perception of social media influence, artificially enlarging
the audience of some people, or they can impact the reputation
of a company. The problem of rising social bots are discussed
in [6]. There are various strategies to tackle the problem of
bot detection. [7] suggested a profile-based approach and [8]
proposed a novel framework on detecting spam content. Also,
[9] presented a machine learning pipeline for detecting fake
accounts and authors in [10], [11] present a method to classify
bots and understand their behaviour in scale.
Fake Engagement: . From this viewpoint, Authors in [12],
focus on the social site of YouTube and the problem of
identifying bad actors posting inorganic contents and inflating
the count of social engagement metrics. They propose an
effective method and show how fake engagement activities on
YouTube can be tracked over time. Likewise, another study,
[13], enumerate the potential factors which contribute towards
a genuine like on Instagram. Based on analysis of liking
behaviour, they build an automated mechanism to detect fake
likes on Instagram which achieves a high precision of 83.5
User Behaviour: On another line of research, the authors
in [14] [15] look at the profile and behavioural patterns of
a user and discussed existing challenges on different OSNs.
By integrating semantic similarity and existing relationships
between users, it is possible to match profiles across various
OSNs [16] [17]. Also, [18] conducted a detailed investigation
of user profiles and proposed a matching scheme. On Insta-
gram, for the sake of mitigating impersonation attack, [13]
explored fake behaviours and built an automated mechanism
to detect fake activities.
As far as our best knowledge, the problem of spotting and
analysing the fake engagement is not studied in the literature
and this is the first study that analyzed this phenomenon
through the lens of impersonators on Instagram.
III. DATA COLLECTION
Considering the Instagram API policies, we implemented
an exclusive crawler in Python to receive data and store in a
MongoDB server in the form of JSON files. We use the official
Instagram API [19] which is based on the Facebook Platform
to gather all posts, comments, and likes. This will return
posts concerning Instagram rules. Note that we only gather
public data excluding any potential sensitive data. The whole
data collection process is designed exclusively for research
purposes and the data is stored in an anonymized format.
A. Communities and Case Studies
To investigate and understand the behaviour of imperson-
ators, it is essential to have a dataset that consists of data from
a variety of categories. Toward that end, we examined imper-
sonators in three influential communities including politician,
news agencies and sports stars. As a result, we are dealing with
a wide range of profile characteristics and user behaviours. In
such a scenario, we have targeted the top famous figures inside
each community. All genuine accounts are official pages, have
Verified Badge and are confirmed by Instagram [20]. Next we
explain briefly each category and the target users inside each
category in this study.
• Politician community is of high interest. Having a large
number of followers, fan pages, oppositions and support-
ers are the main reasons for selecting this community.
Additionally, Political Bot is a new phenomenon in this
area. Donald J. Trump (@realdonaldtrump) the president
of the United States, Barack Obama (@barackobama)
the previous president of the United States, Emmanuel
Macron (@emmanuelmacron) the president of France,
and Theresa May (@theresamay) the Prime Minister of
the United Kingdom (all at the time of writing this paper)
are included as target users in our dataset.
• News Agency is another vital community in which
top English language news broadcasters including BBC
(@bbc), CNN (@cnn), FoxNews (@foxnews), and
Reuters (@reuters) are considered. Use of Social Media
is changing the relationship between the news agencies
and the audience. This community has a large number
of followers from various groups which make it very
interesting category for the popuse of this study.
• Sports Star community represents top sports players in
football and tennis. Nowadays, thanks to social media,
we see sporting star’s habits, milestones and personal
lives every day on our phones. Fake news, Fake profiles,
and Disinformation are considered as serious difficulties
inside this community. Leo Messi (@leomessi), Cristiano
Ronaldo (@cristiano), Rafael Nadal (@rafaelnadal), and
Roger Federer (@rogerfederer) are selected.
B. Dataset
In this study, we use the dataset which is obtained from our
previous studies [2] [1] and the primary target is to analyse the
content that is generated by the impersonators and investigate
the fake engagement. First, we target the previously mentioned
well-known figures on Instagram (see III-A) and collect their
activity from October 2018 until April 2019. The activity
includes posts, comments, likes, and user information. Based
on our methodology, from the the pool of users who reacted
in the shape of comment and like, we extract and identified
3.8K unique impersonators. Next, based on different metrics,
we clustered impersonators into three main clusters (for more
details please see IV). In total, our dataset includes 3.8K
impersonators who generate 4.8K comments and 2.6K likes
across 566 unique posts during the period of 7 months.
C. Validation
A natural risk is that a subset of the comment and likes
that are given to posts may be generated by users who are not
impersonators. So, we further perform manual annotation to
validate the general correctness of our data. To validate our
dataset, we manually looked at the profiles of the imperson-
ators to verify if they were really impersonator. To validate
profiles, accounts of three clusters are completely checked
manually. We filter any incorrectly identified impersonators.
Ethics : In line with Instagram policies, user privacy and eth-
ical consideration defined by the community, we only gather
publicly available data that are obtainable from Instagram.
IV. WHO ARE IMPERSONATORS?
Phase 1: Impersonator Detection. An impersonator is some-
one who pretends or copies the behaviour or actions of
another. Of course, there are many reasons for impersonating
someone. In the first study [2] we answered questions like
who are the impersonators? What is the rate of engagement
in the shape of like and comment? How many impersonators
exist? and What is the activity of this group? We studied
politician community with 3 use cases (D. Trump, B. Obama,
E. Macron) on Instagram and track their activity (with user
reactions) for three months. We presented a methodology
to detect impersonators based on the profile similarity and
we discovered more than 200 fake accounts with different
levels of similarity. Interestingly, While Trump held the most
impersonators, but Macron contained the least (108 vs. 21).
TABLE I: Summary of Impersonators across Clusters
Clusters Type #of uniqueaccount #of comment #of like #of post
*
C0 Fan Page Fan Page 54% 52% 50% 36%
C1 Ordinary User Normal User 34% 37% 29% 24%
C2 Botlike Bot 12% 11% 19.4% 40%
Total Number 3.8K 4.8K 2.6K 566
*the number of unique posts which impersonators reacted to.
Phase 2: Clustering. We, next in the second study [1]
investigated that impersonators are more interested in which
community? Among them, how many distinct hidden groups
exist? what are their characteristics? and How impersonators
are involved in terms of reactions? To answer these ques-
tions as we extended the dataset to 3 communities including
‘politician’, ‘news agency’, and ‘sports star’ communities with
12 famous verified use cases (see III-A), also we enhanced
the detection methodology. So we ended up with 3.8k imper-
sonators with various characteristics. We, next applied three
major clustering methods including K-means, Gaussian Mix-
ture Model, and Spectral Clustering algorithms. We divided
impersonators into 3 clusters based on 10 features such as
username similarity, name similarity, bio similarity, photo
similarity, most common metrics (mcm), number of followers,
number of followees, number of media count, private status,
and verified status. Next, Based on their characteristics and
behaviours we are calling them C0-Fan-Pages, C1-Ordinary-
Users, and C2-BotLike. Table I summarises the dataset across
clusters. Rows present clusters and columns present data types.
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Fig. 1: Engagement per community and cluster: (a) CDF of
number of comments issued by unique impersonator across
communities (3 communities) and (b) across clusters (3 clus-
ters). (c) CDF of number of likes issued by unique imperson-
ator across communities and (d) across clusters.
V. WHAT IS THE FAKE ENGAGEMENT OF IMPERSONATORS?
In this part, we move through the activity of impersonators
to analyse how impersonators are distributing engagement
and in general what is the rate of fake engagement through
different communities?
Active & Passive Engagement. First, let’s look at the
distribution of Active Engagement (comments) and Passive
Engagement (likes) that are issued by impersonators across
clusters and communities which is demonstrated in Figure
1. This figure displays the interest of impersonator amid
communities/cluster. The first notable thing is that in Figure
1(a), while impersonators target all communities with a high
number of comments, but politician and sports earn more
(avg 4.89 vs. 2.81). This difference is even greater in passive
engagement (Figure 1(c)) where sports star hosts the least
number of likes compared to politicians (avg 1.01 vs. 2.75).
Despite, the number of given comments in Sports star still
high. Interestingly, across communities, impersonators mostly
prefer to engage in the shape of Active Engagement rather
than Passive Engagement.
Next, let’s look at the distribution over clusters in Fig-
ure 1(b)(d). Again these engagements are given by unique
impersonators. Interestingly, in all clusters, we can see im-
personators issue more engagement in the shape of active
engagement rather than passive. This shows the importance
of content that is trying to publish. Moreover, as we expected,
botlike is the most active cluster in promoting both active
and passive engagements: While ‘C2 Botlike’ distributes more
comments and likes, but ‘C0 Fan Page’ cluster issues fewer
(avg. comments 5.9 vs. 2.29).
Post distribution. Next, we examine posts to see how Ac-
tive and Passive Engagements are scattered among them.
This distribution is exhibited in Figure 2. On average,
‘C0 Fan Page’ issued 29.5, ‘C1 Ordinary Users’ issued 33.2,
and ‘C2 Botlike’ 2.04 comments per post and this numbers
for like are 125.9, 260.8, and 19.3 per post respectively.
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Fig. 2: Engagement per post: (a) CDF of number of comments
issued by impersonator per post across clusters (b) CDF
of number of likes issued by impersonator per post across
clusters.
The first notable point is ‘C1 Ordinary Users’ spot more
posts compared to ‘C2 Botlike’. This behaviour is the same
in both comments and like engagements. Interestingly, in com-
ments, ≤80% of ‘C2 Botlike’ cluster aim mostly 3 posts while
‘C0 Fan Page’ and ‘C1 Ordinary User’ target 10 times more
posts (110). This reveals bots are targeting some specific (and
limited) posts over communities to issue active engagement
(comment), but are delivering like to all posts.
Comment Age. Another important metric which needs to be
studied is the time of publishing comment by impersonators.
This can support that the comments are published at the
same time or not. This metric can be measured across both
communities and clusters. From the community viewpoint, in
Figure 3(a), impersonators publish sooner in sports star than
politician communities (median 83.5 vs. 170). Moreover, the
news agency has the shortest range of age (median 83.2) and
impersonators mostly comment from hour ≥1. This number
for the sports star is from minute ≥10.
From cluster viewpoint, Figure 3(b), both fan page (median
108) and ordinary user (median 130) clusters begin to write
immediately. Moreover, both have the largest range. The
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Fig. 3: BoxPlot of Comment Age: (a) comment issued by
impersonator across three communities. (b) comment age
issued by impersonator across three clusters.
interesting one is botlike cluster (median 203) which the range
is between two fixed hours (1H to 10H). this behaviour reveals
another peculiar characteristic of bots.
VI. WHAT CONTENT DO IMPERSONATOR PUBLISH?
In this section, we aim to discuss what impersonators
publish in form of comments? What is the content and topic
of their comments? Is there any differences among clusters?
Analysis of Comments. First, let’s look at the wordcloud
of the most frequent word extracted from comments across
communities (Figure 4). Words are colour-coded. Mostly, in
Sports star community, we see ‘king’ and ‘legend’ keywords
besides the name of the players which give positive support.
Likewise, in politicians, we see the same trend and most
dominant words are ‘best’, ‘love’, ‘great’, and ‘thanks’. More-
over, some words such as ‘follow’ (refers to follow me), and
‘story’ (refers to check my story) are replicated which could
be generated by bots that are mainly trying to attempt users
to follow something.
Fig. 4: The most frequent words across communities.
Next, we aim to understand the general sentiment statistics
across communities and clusters. This can give a good insight
about the opinion expressed by impersonators. To do this, we
use Affin library [21] which is one of the most popular lexicons
that can be used. Figure 5 presents general sentiment and
summary statistics for comments distributed by impersonators
in each cluster across communities. The output could be zero,
positive, or negative number. In communities, we can see that
the spread of sentiment polarity is much higher in sports star
and politician as compared to news agency where a lot of the
comments seem to be having a negative polarity. Practically,
in the news agency, no negative comment exists. So, this
community is a target for botlikes. However, we can observe
a diverse range of comments in both politician and sports star
communities. Form cluster viewpoint, the average sentiment
for ‘C2 Botlike’ is 2, for ‘C1 Ordinary User’ is 0.7, and for
‘C0 Fan Page’ is 0.5. This claims bots distribute relatively
positive text.
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Fig. 5: Sentiment score for comments issued by impersonator
across clusters and communities.
Next, in Figure 6 we visualize the frequency of sentiments
across communities and clusters. Surprisingly, in Figure 6(a),
while Fan pages published the most number of negative
comments, but bots issued the least. Usually, fan pages are
controlled by humans. We list some random comments of
impersonators across clusters in Table II. “I post trump memes
every day! Check out my page?”; this comment (row [1])
caught in D. Trump post attempting audience to follow fan
pages. These kind of comments are repeated over different
posts and clearly are published by bots.
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Fig. 6: Sentiment polarity: (a) Number of comment per cluster.
(b) Number of comment per community.
In Figure 6(b), by considering communities, Sports star
have more neutral comments due to the presence of comments
which are talking about sporting events without the presence of
any emotion or feeling. Besides, both sports star and politician
have the same rate of negative comments. This is an example
of positive comment in politicians (Table II, row [3]): “You are
my president and I love you forever”, and this is an example
of negative in sports star (Table II, row [16]): “kill ur self”.
Duplication of comments. Next, we investigate how many
duplicated comments are published by impersonators. This
important metric confirms if clusters follow some particular
patterns of publishing or hire automated bots to advertise
something with a frequency. Toward that end, we implemented
a similarity module and we were able to identify duplicated
comments across communities which are demonstrated in
Figure 7. To estimate the degree of similarity between com-
ments, we use cosine similarity technique and we employ
NLTK [22] library inside scikit-learn [23]. Comments that
have a similarity of ≥0.95 (scale 0 to 1) are considered
as duplicated text. Note that emojis are skipped from the
measurement. As we observed, all clusters are utilising pre-
defined text (with high rate of similarity) and common patterns
to publish comments. It is crystal clear in Figure 7(a), botlike
cluster distributes with a higher unusual rate (median 7) than
ordinary users (median 3) and fan pages (median 2). To be
sure that duplicated comments are distributed with pre-defined
algorithms, we manually checked the comment time. ≥95% of
the duplicated comments have the same publishing age (from
the post) which clarify our claim.
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Fig. 7: CDF of number of duplicated comments: (a) across
clusters (b) across communities.
From community viewpoint, in Figure 7(b), impersonators
hugely target politician (median 2) and sports star (median 2)
communities by writing repeated comments and surprisingly
there is no sign of duplication in the news agency. We, next
check the text of duplicated comments by manual examination
among all.
This part contains more experiments on the text and the
correlation of the words that are used by clusters. As the
matter of space, we include other plots in a separated report
available online1. In general, 75% of C0 Fan Page duplicated
comments are emojis, and hugely they invite audience by pre-
defined text such as “follow us” and “best of Ronaldo” to
their pages to gain followers. In C1 Ordinary Users, again
1https://sites.google.com/view/iengagement/home
we see ≤53% of comments are emojis. Comments contain
human-generated text and related hashtags are used to express
the support. Most of the emojis are positive such as “heart”,
“like”, and “thumbs up”. C2 Botlike cluster contains ≤%70
emojis in both positive and negative feeling. Comments hugely
hold very short text, hashtags, and sometimes mentions (start
with @ sign).
TABLE II: Some example of comments
# Cluster written comments by impersonators (randomly selected)
1
C0 Fan Page
I post trump memes every day! Check out my page?
2 king leo
3 You are my president and I love you forever
4 Thanks for supporting ALL Americans!
5 if u love messi like this comment
6 Follow @mtfoot for more!
7
C1 Ordinary User
Congratulations juventus team and @cristiano
8 King cristiano
9 We are with you, if you not gone win the balondor,will be back stronger next year! forzaaa @cristiano Te Amo
10 You deserve all the best next time you want the hat-trick
11 Good luck legend, I hope you scored 3 goals tomorrow
12 Great win for @juventus, so happy @cristiano
13
C2 Botlike
More Americans are now employed than ever
recorded before in our nation’s history. President Donald Trump
14 President Trump miracle from God & for the country
15 Check my profile and my story
16 kill ur self
17 Beautiful pics Rafa! Thank you for sharing
18 thanks God that you are our president
Note: Emojis are removed from the text.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, this paper has performed a first analysis of the
content and engagements generated by impersonators on Insta-
gram. Based on our previous studies, we did an investigation
to discover the behaviour of impersonators and the generated
content in three major communities. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that conducts such analysis
on Instagram. We used the dataset of nearly 4K impersonator
which is extracted from our previous paper [1]. We analysed
the distribution of issued Active and Passive engagement given
by impersonator across three major communities. Next, we
focused to the written comments by impersonators to perceive
what kind of content do they publish. We obtained valuable
knowledge by using various text analysis techniques which
explains better the behaviours of impersonators.
As future work, This study could be extended from various
angles: first, it is desirable to train a machine/deep learning
classifier for comments. This can be done by considering some
other important profile metrics alongside text features. As a
result, this model could predict at first whether the content
of the text is fake or not and second, evaluate whether the
publisher of that comment is impersonator or not. Another
perspective is to study other social media to understand is
there any similar pattern across different platforms and can
we correlate the identified profiles of impersonators.
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